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ABSTRACT
This peper is concerned with the classic "guns versus butter" dilemma for
two countries engaged in an arms race. The "West" is a decentralised market
economy whose government uses optimal taxation to provide a public good,
defence, and the "East" is a centrally planned economy. Utilities of the two
countries depend on consumption, leisure and defence. Defence is a
characteristic, which ia en increasing function of the difference between
home and foreign weapon atocke. In this way the problem of competitive arms
accumulation is modelled as a differential game. The cooperatíve outcome
leads to a moratorium on investment in weapone. Two non-cooperative
solutiona are compared. The flrst one is the standard open-loop Nash
equilibrium solution, which presumea that the countries cannot condition
their investment in arms on the rival's weapon stock. The aecond one is the
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium aolution, which presumes that countries can
monitor foreign weapon stocks. The perfect equilibrium leads to lower levels
of arms, so that it is more efficient to allow countries to monitor each
other's weapon stocks. Moreover, the perfect equilibrium strategies lead to
a more satisfactory strategic underpinning of the Richardson equations. The
full characterisation of the two non-cooperetive equilibria also ellows for
comparative statics with respect to the underlying parameters of the model.
Finally, it is shown what happens when one of the countries tries to acquire
leadership by announcing its strategy beforehand.
" The authors are grateful for the constructive comments of the anonymous
referees and of Fons Groot. An earlier version was presented to a Conference
on Economic Aspects of International Security, Chatham House, London, June
1986, organised by the Centre for Economic Policy Research.1
1. INTRODUCTION
Conflict over arms accumulation has in recent years become a more
prevalent feature of relationa between West and East. The political eapecta
of the arms race receive a great deal of attention botA in the press and in
academic studies (e.g. Richardaon [1960], Boulding [1961], McOuire [1965]
and SIPRI [1982]). Much of the theoretical mnalyois of arma conflict umee
game theory (e.g. Schelling [1980]). The welfare of one country depends on
the level of security which is perceived to be an increasing function of its
own weapon atock and a decreasing function of the foreign weapon atock. This
may be because any imbalance in weapon stocks increases the likelihood of
loosing a possible war and increases the likelihood that a war might in fact
be initiated. Alternatively, a country may aimply feel that it gains
international prestige from having a sore euperior army than ita rivals.
Both of these factors can in principle lead to a balance of terror. Such
defence externalities can alao be ahown to lead to prisoner's dilemma
situations. In the absence of cooperation each country builds up a larger
weapon atock then with cooperation, because in the absence of commitments no
country truats the other countries to atick to a negotíated level of lower
or zero weapon atocks. Other atudies concentrate on the technolog3cal end
atrategic aspecta of armm and the relationship to the probability that war
breaks out (Ssaty [1968], Intriligator [1975]. Intriligator end Brito [1976,
1982]).
From the point of view of an econwist the purely political analyses of
conflict over arms do not pay adequate attention to the "guna versus butter"
dilemma. A higher level of investment ín weapona eventually increasea the
feeling of security and thus welfare. but it also means that there are lesa
resources available for private sector consumptíon end therefore welfarediminiahes. A variety of studies employ optimal control and differential
game theory to analyse the intertemporal trade-offs inherent in such "guns
versus butter" dilemmas (e.g. Brito [1972], Deger and Sen [1984]). The
problem with the differential gaae atudiea ia that they consider open-loop
Nash equilibrium solutions whereas feedback Nesh equilibrium solutiona are
more appropriate for two reasons. Firstly, the feedback model employs more
realistic information patterna, since each country cen nowadays be assumed
to be able to monitor the current levels of each other's weapon atocks
rather than only the initisl levels. Secondly, the linear-quadratic feedback
model provides a strategic underpinning of the Richerdson equatlons, which
show up as first-order conditions for optimal investment behaviour in arms.
The informational non-uniquenesa resulting from closed-loop information
patterna with memory (Baqnr and Olader [1982]) ia reaolved when the
principle of subgame-perfectness (Selten [1975]) is impoeed, which has the
added advantnge thnt the resulting feedbeck equilibrium strategies are
credible. The feedback approach to the problem of competitive arms
accumulation was proposed before (Simaan and Cruz [1975]), but that paper
dces not give e full characterisation of the strategic equilibrium, so that
it was not possible to compare the levels of weapon atocka in the feedback
approach with the levels in the open-loop approach and to perform
comparative statica with respect to the underlying paremeters of the
behavioural model.
The main objectives of this paper are to provide a more satisfactory
strategic foundation of the Richardson model and to show that the subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium leads to less weapon accumulation in both countries
than the open-loop Nesh equilibrium. This means that the subgame-perfect
Nash equilibriw is more efficient, since both countries obtain higher3
welfare as they can consume more gooda end leisure without feeling less
secure. The policy concluaion ie that both countriee should be encouraged to
monitor each other's weapon atocks. The analysis is aet up as followa. There
are two countries involved in the erms race. The West is a decentralised
market economy whose government maximiaea the discounted utility of a
representative household end leviea lump-sum taxea in order to finence
investment in arma end provide a public good, defence. The Eest is a
centrally planned economy. Utility in both countríes ís a function of
consumption, leisure end defence. Defence ie a characteristic which dependa
on the difference between home and foreign weapon atocka. When conaumption
and leisure are normal goods, there is a"guns versus butter" dilemma as
more taxes lead to more weapons at the expense of less consumption and
leisure. Section 2 Formulatea thia two-country model. The model ie kept as
simple as possible. Extensions to more general utility functions,
distortionary taxation in the West or other formulations, which pay more
attention to the different economic systems of the two countries, do not
change the results of this paper on the impact of information. Section 3
derives the main cooperative outcome of the reaulting differential game end
shows that cooperation leads to e moratorium on investment in weapons.
Section 4 gives the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium for the case that
countriea cannot obaerve their rival'e current weapon atock. Section 5 gives
the perfect equilibrium, which corresponda to the case that countriea can
monitor their rival's current weapon atock. It ia shown that this approech
is more efficient, leads to leas weapon accumulation and providea a more
satisfactory strategic underpinning of the Richardson equationa. The
resulting paremeters of the Richardson equatíons are compared with what
would result with the open-loop approach and e aenaitivity analysis for4
these parameters with respect to the underlying paremeters of the model is
performed. Sectíon 6 attends to the case in which one of the countries tries
to become e Stackelberg leader by ennouncing its policy beforehend. It is
ahown that the open-loop Steckelberg equilibrium leads to less weapon
accumulation then the correaponding Naah equilibrium and mekea the leader
rorse off than the follorer. The perfect Stackelberg equilibrium, as well ea
the perfect consistent conjectures equilibrium, coincidea with the subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrlum. Section ~ concludes the paper end contains some
suggestions for further research.
2. THE "GUNS VERSUS BUTTER" DILEI~QM
The West is a decentraliaed market economy with a repreaentative
household, a representative firm and a government. There are no domestic or
foreign financiel sssets and the economy dces not engage in international
trade. There is no private capital accumulatíon, although the government
dces invest in weapon stocks. There is only one domestically produced
commodity, which cen be used for both consumption and investment purposes.
The government demanda goods for inveatment, the household supplies labour
and demands goods for conaumption, and the firm demands labour and aupplies
goods. The real rage adjusts in order to ensure labour market equilibrium.
The government financea the investment in arms, i.e., the provision of the
public good defence, by means of non-distortionary taxation and maximises
the utility of the representative household. The household maximisea utility
u(c,.L,d), where c, .L and d denote conaumption, lebour supply and defence,
sub~ect to ita budget constraint 0~ c C wl . n- i, where w, rt and T denote
the real wage, profita end lump-sum taxes, respectively. Utility ís assumed
to be separable in defence. Defence ia a characteristic (cf. Lancestec5
[1966]), which is an increasing function of the own weapon stock, e, and 8
decreasing function of the forei - ~ gn weapon atock, a, that ia d~ D(a,e ).
Furthermore, it is asaumed that en equsl increese in both home and foreign
weapon stocks leaves the level oP defence or security unaffected, that is ~ ~
Da(a,a )--D ~(s,e )) 0. For an interior aolution, the marginal rate of
a
substitution between leisure, 1-~, and conaumption equals the real
opportunity cost of leisure, that ia -u~~uc z w. The firm meximises profits
rt- f(~i) - w.E, where f ia a concave production function, which yielda w~
f~(~). Gooda market equilibrium impliea f(~) - c. g, where g denotes the
level of oovernment investment, end the government's budget conatraint is g
- i. It follows that the indirect utility function for the government can,
without loss of generality, be written as
u(C(B).L(g).d) ~ U(B) ~ D(e.ar) (1)
where U' ~ ucC~ ~ u~L'. C' -(ucf„~ u~ t
u~f,)~~. L' ~-(u~ ~ uccf')~G
~d h a-[ucf " ' u,t,t r 2uc~f' ' ucc(f')2] ) 0. it will be eeaused that
consumptíon and leieure are normal gooda, ao that en increase in taxes
reduces consumptíon, leiaure and thus utility (C'CO, L')o, U'(0). A
sufFicient condition for this saaumption is that utility is also aeparable
in consumption and leiaure. The esaumption that utility is separable in
defence is primarily made for methodological reasons. It can be argued that
the problem of arms eccumulation ahould be modelled as an insurance where
the level of defence decreases the probabílity of being ettacked and
thecefore increases the probability that nobody survives and that the
utílity of all the current and all future generatíons from then on is zero
(Shepherd [1988]). Thís argument auggeata that, if an attack only affecta
the utility of the current generation, an appropriate utility functíon might
be P[e-a.] U(g), where P[.] denotea the inatantaneous probability of not6
being attacked, P')0, and 'U(g) denotes the indirect utility function. Taking
the logarithm yields ( 1) with U(g) ~ log(' U(g)) and D(s,a )- log(P(e-a )). A
proper analysis of the probabilities of survival, when en attack destroys
the current and all Puture generations, requires en intertemporal atochastic
fremework, but thia leada to a differentisl game formulation which ia
extremely difficult to solve. In any case, such an intergenerational
enalysis is more appropriate for a nuclear arms than for a conventíonal arms
build-up. However, if the enalysis allowa for nuclear attacks where all
future generations are wiped out, then the only credible, non-cooperative
equilibrium is for neither country to accumulate missiles. When the build-up
of nuclear weapons leads to a finite probability of an attack which is too
horrendous to consider and when there exists a zero probability of attack,
there is no incentive for arms build-up. In other words, deterrence requires
the probability of comitment to inveatmenta which may imply launching
missiles and blowing up the world and which are therefore not rational to
carry out if called upon to do so. This seems to exclude perfect equílibrium
as an appropriate solution concept for deterrence games.
The separable specifications of utility investigated so far (see ven der
Plceg and de Zeeuw [1989]) show the seme role of information, ao that the
maln result of this paper aeems to be robuat with respect to alterations in
the utility function. In order to be able to obtain analytical solutions a
second-order Ta,ylor eeríes approxímntion oP indirect utility is adopted. IP
preferences are quadratic end technology ia linear, the approximation ís
exact. This yields a strategic underpinning of the Richardaon equations end
enablea a comparison of different geme equilibris as well as a sensitivity
analysis with respect to the underlyíng paremeters of the model. The
quadratic approximation is given byU(g) t D(a.e )- 9~ . B16 - 1~2 B2g2 . B3(e-e~) - 1~2 84(e-e )2
- BD - 1~2 82(g-g)2 - 1~2 B4(a-e.-m)2, B2,B4 ) 0 (2)
where g- B1~B2 and ~- g3~B4 ) 0 can be interpreted as the target level of
public apending end the deaired lead in weepon atocks, respectively. The
assumption of normal goods, U' - B1 - Bzg ( 0, impliee that g) g for all g
) 0, so that B1 ( 0 muat hold. The intertemporal utility of Che Weat for the
problem atarting at time t ie given by the infinite-horizon value function
V(t~g.8 )- J IU(g) i D(a.e ) ] exPl-r(s-t)] da
c
(3)
where r is the rate of time ' preference. The West maximises V(O,aQ,a~), where
~
a~ and e~ are the initial weapon stocks, subject to the arms accumuletion
for home weapons
á- g- ba, a(~) ' a0 (4)
where b is the depreciation rate, and si.ilarly for foreign weapons. The
dilemma of "guns versus butter" is that high taxee are required to finance a
large build-up of weapons, but this necessarily implies less private
consumption and leisure.
The East is a command or centrally planned economy. The varíables in the
East are denoted by an asteriak. Because the purpose of the paper ia only to
show the impact of monitoring, it is assumed that the East has the seme
~ ~ ~ technologies end preferences as the Weat. The government plens c,.i and g
~ w ~
to maximise utilíty, u(c ,.i ,d ), subject to the material balance condition,
r ~ ~
f(~i ) s c . g. This yields the same indirect utility function es in the
~ w
West, U(g ) . D(a ,a).
The decentralised market economy of the West and the centrally planned
economy of the East are identical, because identical technologíes end
preferences have been assumed and because no distortions or marketa
imperfections have been considered end therefore the fundamental theorem of
welfare economics holds. If the West had to levy distortionary taxes on
labour income, there would be asymmetries and the East and West would not
have the same indirect utility function. With identical technologies and
preferences, the tax distortions in the West imply lower levela of
employment, output end consumption for a given level of government
investment in arms. However, the conclusiona with repect to the comparison
of different game equilibria will be the same ( see van der Ploeg end de
Zeeuw [1989]). Mother for~ of eaymmetry between the two economies occurs
when one allows for rigid wages and pricea in the ahort run, because then
the West is likely to be in a regime of Keynesian unemployment and the East
in a regime of repressed ínflation (aee Malinvaud [1977]).
3. COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOUR
Pareto-efficient outcomea for the differential game formulated in
~
section 2 are found from the maximisation with respect to g and g of
J {a[U(g) . D(a,á) ] . (1-a)[u(g) . D(a ,e)]} exp(-rt) dt
0
(5)
subject to (4) and A~ g - bar, a(0) - a0, where 0 C a C 1. It follows
that the marginal disutilities of government investment in arms ín terms of
~
foregone consumption end leisure (-aU'(g) and -(1-a)U'(g ) for the Weat end
the East, respectively) should equsl the marginal values of weapon stocks,
~
which are denoted by a end ~, reapectively, if this is feasible. Otherwise,
if the marginal disutility of government spending exceeda the marginal value
of weapons, the complementary slackness conditions imply that no investment
in weapons take place (g ~ 0 if -aU'(g) ) a). The marginal values of the
weapon atocks must satisfy9
~ - (r.b)a - acDa(a,ar) - ( 1-oc)Da(a-,e), lim exp(-rt)a(t)a(t) - 0
t~
and
a a (r,b)~- - aD ~la.fl ) - (1-a)D m(e",a).
a a
~ r




One interpretation of (6)-(7) is that the "rental" charge plua the
depreciation charge minus the capital gains term defines the user cost of
weapons and should match the marginal utility oP weapons to the world. If
equal weights are attached to the West end the East (ac . 1~2), ít follows
~
thet in the steady state ~ L a - 0, sa in the steady atate (or when the
initial weapon stocks of the two countries are the seme) the game ia zero-
sum at the margin with respect to s and a(i.e., Da(a,a') t Da(e~,a) --
r
ze4(8-a )- 0 end aimilarly the sum of marginal utilitiea of defence with
respect to the foreign weapon atock ia zero). For 91 ~ 0 the ateady state
cooperative outcome is a corner solution, but for 91 - 0 the corner solution
coincidea with the unconatrained eolution. To avoid corner solutiona, both
in this sectíon and in later sectiona, and to enaure that the asaumption of
normal goods is satisfied Por all g) 0, the value of 91 can be taken to be
M ~ zero. It follows that in the steady atate g a g a a L a ~ 0, so that the
cooperative outcome is to have a moratorium on investment ín weapons and to
run down weapon stocks until these have fallen to zero.
This analysis leans heavily on the property that the game is zero-sum at
the margin, which is satisfied because the defence characteristic depends
upon the difference in arms levels. For exemple, when it depends also upon
the sum of arms levels and is given by
D(a,a) - 83(a-a) - 1~2 84(e-a )2 . a5(a.á) - 1~2 86(a.a )2 (8)10
with 85,86 ) 0, the game is no longer zero-sum at the margin in the long
run. This set-up can easily be ahown to result in
s(m) - a (m) - 285~[lr.b)b82~486] ) 0, (9)
so that when both countries want a positive stock of weapons between the two
of them (85 ) 0) their steady-state levels of weapons will be positive. This
defence characteristic may be realistic when the two countries want a
positíve stock of wanpons to act as a deterrence for third countriea. The
tiansient cooperative eolution is beat obtained by aolving for the global
s
averages and global differences separately. This is possible, because (a-a )
and (a-~ ) on the one hand and 1~2 (a~s ) and 1~2 (AtA ) on the other hand
form two decoupled sub-systems of differential equationa. Application of
this procedure and some algebraic manipulations yield the cooperative
[rajectory
s(t)- a(m)[1-exP(uat)] . 1~2 (fl0ia~)exp(uat) . 1~2 (e0-e~)exP(udt) (1~)
and similarly for a ( t), where ua : 1~2 [r- (r.2b)2~1686~82] C 0 denotes
the stable eigenvalue associated with the system of global averages and ud -
1~2 [r- (r~2b)2.1684~8Z] C 0 denotes the stable eigenvalue associated with
the system of global differencea. Again it cen be seen that, if the initial
~
arms levels are the same (e~ - a~) and countries only care about differences
in arms levels (85 ~ 86 3 0), the cooperative outcome is to have a
moretorium on inveatment in nrma end to run down stocks vie wear and tear
~
until these have fallen to zero (s(t) - a(t) z apexp(-bt)). In general, the
adjustment speeds up when the relative priorities of "guns" rather than
"butter" (8y~82 and 86~82) increase. The level of investment ín arms in the
cooperative outcome can be written as g. gc - 1~2 (ud.b)(a -a) ~ 1~2
(Wa~b)(aie ), where gc - ba(m), so that investment in home arms is a11
negative function of the global stock of arms and of the exceas of the atock
of home erms over foreign erms.
In the absence of a~echeniam which enforces the cooperative outcome,
each country has en incentive to deviate by increeaing its aecurity at the
expense of ita ríval, if the desired lead in weapona ia poaitive (83 ~ 0).
Therefore the cooperative outcome will only be conaiderad as a benchmark for
the relative efficiency of the different non-cooperative outcomea, which
will be considered in the next aectiona.
4. OPEN-LOOP NASH EpUILIBRIUM
Consider the situation where the West and the East do not cooperate and
where neither country dominatea the arms race, so that a Nash equilibrium is
appropriate. The Nash equilíbrium concept can lead to different types of
solutions when applied to differentiel games (e.g. Starr and Ho [1969a,b]).
In order to analyse the problem of competitive arms accumulation Brito
[1972] employed the open-loop Nash equilibrium concept. This concept
presumea that the investments in arms at each point in time are only
conditioned on the initiel we f apon stocks, a0 and a0, and that each country
pre-commits itself to e path of investment in arms. It follows that the
expected ínvestments of the rival do not depend on past or current weapon
stocks or on pest or current investments oi' the country under consideration.
The expectations of each other's path of investment are correct in
equilibrium. In order to be able to compare the open-loop Nash equilibrium
with other equilibria in the next sections it will be fully characteriaed in
this section. The first-order conditions, which result from Pontryagin's
maximum principle, give rise to12
é-(atal)le2 - ba. a(o) ~ ao
~ - (a.~81)IB2 - ba . a-(o) - a0 (12)
a z(r~ó)a - 93 . B4(a-e ), lim exp(-rt)a(t)e(t) - 0 (13)
t-~
.s . . ~ ~
a ~ (r.b)a - 93 . 84(e -e), lim exp(-rt)a (t)e (t) - 0 (14)
t-~
~
where a and a denote the marginal values of their own weapon atocks for the
West and the East, respectively. The marginal disutility of public spending,
-U'(g) - Q2g - 81, hes to match the marginal value of weapons, a, which
gives investment in arms as an increasing function of its marginal value, g
-(a~Bl)192. The ateady atate oP (il)-(14) yields
g(a) - g(m) ~ ba(m) ~ ba (m) ~(91IA2)~ B3IC(r.b)B2] O~ g ~ 0. (15)
The steady-state levels of weapon stocks are positive, which can be
interpreted es the familiar deterrence or "balance of terror" argument. They
increase when the discount rate or the depreciation rate decreases, when the
relative priority of "butter" rather than "guns" (82194) decreases, end when
the deaired lead in weapon stocks over the rival country (83184) increases.
The steady state is a saddlepoint, since there are two stable eigenvalues
(-b and lI2 [r- (r.2b)24884IB2]) associated with the backward-looking
~
variables, a and a, and two unatable eigenvalues (r?6 and ll2
2 [r. (r~2b) .894182]) associated with the forward-looking variables, a and
.
a. Since (11)-(14) is effectively a perfect-foresight syetem, Buiter's
[1984] method of spectral decomposition or the method of undetermined
ccefficients can be used to solve í t. It can be shown that the stable
~
manifold is gíven by l~ - y82(a -a) . 83l(r~b), where
y ~ -ll4 [r.2b - (r.2b)2.864192] ) 013
0 0 .
so that g- g . y(a -fl), It follows that investment in weapona is higher
than its steady-state level when foreign weapon stocka exceed home weapon
stocks and that the marginal increase in investoent, y, increases when the
discount rate or the depreciation rate decreases and when the relative
priority of "butter" cather then "guna" (Q2~B4) decreasee. Upon eubstitution
one obLains
.
~- g 4 w(a -a) - ba, a(0) - a0
8- 8 ~ y (a-a~) - bar, a(0) - a0




and -2y-b) are both negative. Note that an increase in the depreciation
rate increases the magnitude of both eigenvalues and therefore apeeds up the
route to the steady state. Equations ( 16)-(17) can be looked upon as
Richardson's [196pj equations, where y is the "defence" coefficient, y~b
the "fatigue" ccefficient and g the "grievence" or "hetred" ccefficient.
However, this interpretation seems inappropriate in view oP the open-loop
nature of the aolution concept. In the open-loop Nash equilibrium the
countries cannot condition their investments on current weapon atocka, so
that g~ g , y(a -e) should be interpreted as a relation between the
optimal sequence of levels of investment and the resulting sequence of
weapon stocks, and not as a feedback strategy for investment in arms. Olsder
[1977] calls this the "open-loop, open-eye" repreaentation of the open-loop
solution, but when monitoring of weapon stocka is feasible the "closed-loop,
open-eye" representation of the closed-loop solutíon seems more appropriate
(see section 5),
Equations (16)-(17) can be integrated to give the open-loop Nash
equilibrium strate~y
g(t) ' 8 ' Y (a0-a0)exp[-(2y.b)t] (18)14
with trajectory
e(t) ~ e(m)[1-exp(-bt)] t 1~2 ( a~4a~)exp(-bt)
~ ll2 (e0-ap)exp[-(2v ~b)t] (19)
~ r
and similarly for g and a, where a(m) - g~b. When both countries start
with identical weapon stocks (a0 a e~), investment in weapons is always at
its steady-state level (g(t) z g, for all t) 0) and any excess of the
initial level of weapon atocks over the steady-state
eliminated at the rate of depreciation. When the rival
weapon atock exceeds the home inítisl weapon stock,




speed at which the
difference in i-nitiel weapon stocks is eliminated, 2y.b --1!' [r-
(r.2b)2t8S4~92], increases when the diacount rate decreases and when the
depreciatíon rate or the relative priority of "guns" rather than "butter"
increases. This speed of adjustment can easily be shown to be less than the
speed of adjustment of the cooperative outcome (-ud in section 3), so that
lack of cooperation slows down adjustment.
Since the marginal valuea of Eastern weapon stocks to the West end vice
versa do not affect the open-loop Nash equilibrium, it does not matter
whether the countries observe their own weapon atock or not. This meens that
the open-loop Nash equilibrium also describes the situation where each
country monitors its own weapon stock, but not the weapon stock of the rival
country. The next section consíders the situation where each country can
slso monitor the foreign weapon stock.
5. PERFECT NASH EQUILIBRIUM
The closed-loop Nash equilibrium allows each country to condition its
investment in weapons on the current end past stocks of weapons. This type15
of information structure admits, among others, memory and threat atrategies,
so that the solution set is non-unique (Basar and Olsder [1982]). However,
if the principle of aubgeme perfectnesa (Selten [1975]) is imposed, then
uniqueness typically results. The outcome will be called the eubReme-aerfect
Nash equilibrium. Thia equilibrium concept in cloaed-loop atrategiea, which
will depend only upon the current weapon atocks of the two countries,
requires that for each subgame the relevant part of the aet of etrategiea is
in Nash equilibrium. A subgame in this context ia e game over the remainder
of the time horizon, that is over [t,m) rather than [O,m). The restriction
of the solution to a subgame must be a Nash equilibrium for all t E[0,~)
and for all possible levels of weapon atocka at t. Each country expecta the
other country to react rationally at time t to the information about the
current weapon stocks at time t and in equilibrium these expectations are
correct. Subgame perfectnesa rules out threat equilibrie, which rely on
information patterns with memory, and equilibria which imply future
investments that are not rational to carry out if called uport to do so in
the future. This set-up is analogous to the requirement that the aolution to
the differential game has to satisfy Bellman's principle of optimality. In
that context Starr and Ho [1969b] and Símaan end Cruz [1975] refer to the
outcome as the feedback Nash equilibrium. The subgame-perfect or feedback
Nash equilibrium can be found by dynamic programsing.
The maximisation in the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the West
~ ~
yields g-(Va.91)~B2 ~ C(t,a,a ), where V(t,a,a ) is the value function for
the West, and similarly for the East. Upon substitution, the Hemilton-
Jacobi-Bellmen equations become the set of coupled partiel differentisl
equations
rV - Vt - UIG(t,a,ar)J . D(a,sa) . Va(g-ba) . V ~(g -ba ) (20) l
a16
~ ~ l ~ ~ - ~ -~ r
rV - Vt - U G(t,e,a)1 . D(a ,a) . Va(g-b: V ~(g -ba ) (21)
s
where U end D are given by the quadratic approximation (2). In general it is
~
very difficult to find value functions V and V that solve (20)-(21). For
the quadratic approximation, however, quadratic value functions lead to en
analytical solution. Hence, presume that V is given by
V(t,a,a ) ~ PO . Ple . p2a - lI2 e P a' (22)
~
where a is the row-vector ( a, a) end P ~[Pi,] ia a positive semi-definite
4 ~ ~ ~ ~
symmetric matríx, and similarly for V( t,a ,a) with row vector e~(a , a)
. . . . y
and paremetera
p0, pl, p2 and P . Substitution of (22) in (20)-(21) and
~ 2 ~2 ~ ~ ' '
equating coefficients on s, e, e, a and ea yields
pl s pl, p2 s p2, P
a P end the set of coupled differentiel equations
P1 - (r.b)P1 - 93 . [181~p1)P11 t (81`pl`p2)P12]~B2 (23)
d2 :(r,b)P2 ~ e3 ~[(81`pl)(P12`P22) ` p2P11]~82 (24)
P11 - (r`2b)P11 ` (P11`~12)~82 - B4
P22 - (r.2b)P22
` (P12`2P11P22),82 - 84
(25)
(26)
P12 - (r.2b)P12 ` (P22`2P11)P12~82 f 84. (2Ï)
There is only one steady state of (23)-(27) which ensures that the matríx P
is positive semi-definite. Thie eteady state is given by
P11 - P22 ' -P12 - -1~6 82[r.2b - (r.2b)2.12B4182] ~ 0 (28)
P1 - -P2 ' 9283~[(rtb)8z'P11]. (29)
It follows that the inveatment strategies in the perfect Nash equilibcium
are given by g- gp . y~(a.-e) and g- gp . t~(e-s ) where
yp ~ P11~82 ) 0
and where the steady-state level of investment gp ) 0 1s given by
(30)
ep' g(m) - g(m) ' ba(m) - baM(m) - 81~82 ` 83~[82(r'b)`P11~ ~ g' (31)17
As in the open-loop Nash equilibrium, the steady-state levels of investment
in weapon stocks, gp (the grievance ccefficient), and the marginal increase
in investment, yp (the defence coefficient), increeae when the diacount rete
or the depreciation rate decreasea mnd when the relative priority of
"butter" rather than "guns" ( 82~94) decreeses, end the ateady-state levels
of weapon atocks increase when the desired lead in reepon mtocka over the
rival country ( B3~B4) increases. Upon substitution of the investment
strategy of the West in (4) one obtains
fl - ~ f ~(a -a) - ba, a(0) - ao (32)
and similarly for the East. In contrast with the results of the open-loop
Nash analysis, it seems appropriate to view these equations as Richardson's
[1960] equations, as inveatmenta in arma in the perfect Nesh equilibrium are
conditioned on the observable weapon atocks. Olsder [19~~] calls the
investment etrategies the "closed-loop, open-eye" representation of the
closed-loop solution in contrast with the "closed-loop, closed-eye"
representation, which refers to the expected sequence of levels of
inveatment in arma for the closed-loop eolution. It followa that it is
meaningful to consider the perfect Neah equilibrium for the dlfferential
game formulated in section 2 as the strategic underpinning of the Richardson
equationa wíth yp ae the defence ccefficient, yp.b as the fatigue
ccefficient and gp as the grievance or hatred ccefficient. Obviously, it is
possible to integrate ( 32) over time to give the enalogues of (18) (the
"closed-loop, closed-eye" representation) and (19) with g and y replaced
by gp and y~.
The most interesting aspect of the comparison between the open-loop Nesh
equilibrium and the perfect Nesh equilibrium ia that monitoring of foreign
weapon stocks decreases the grievence ccefficient g ) gp, so thati8
monitoring leads to less accumulatlon weapon stocks than in the ebsence of
monítoring. The intuition behind this result is that, when one country
considera the purchaee of one additional unit of weapons, it considers the
direct marginal contribution to security end welfare, Da, but it also
conaiders the atrategic reactíon of the rival. The rival will obaerve the
additional purchase and will feel leas secure, so that it will elso purchase
more weapons. Therefore the marginal contribution to security and welfare is
reduced to Da . ypV ~( Da, so that there is lesa incentive to invest in
s
weapons than when countries cannot observe their rival's weapon stock. Since
the perfect Nash eq~ilibrium leads to more "butter" and less "guns", but
with the same feeling of security, it is more efficient than the open-loop
Nash equilibrium. The obvlous policy implication is that countries should be
encouraged to monitor each other's weapon atocks as thís will lead to some
unilateral disarmament end higher welfare. Mother feature of monitoring is
that the defence ccefficient can easíly be shown to be larger than without
0 monitoring ( ~ y). It follows tnat the adjustment to the (lower) steady-
state levels of arms is faster than in the absence of monitoring. However,
this speed of adjustment can be ahown to be still less than the speed of
adjustment of the cooperative outcome (2yp.b (-ud).
Note that, when defence is a linear function of the difference in weapon
stocks (94 z 0), the defence ccefficients are zero (y~ - y - 0) and the
grievance ccefficient is independent of whether countríes can monitor their
rival's weapon stock or not (gP - g). In fact for this apeciel cese the
open-loop end subgeme-perfect Nash equilibria coincide and therefore
monitoring dces not influence the levela of weapon atocka. This result
generaliaea to ihe case where defence ia aeperable in home end foreign
weapon atocks (ven der Plceg and de Zeeuw ~1989]). Finally, note that, when19
neither country attempts to establish a lead in weapon stocks (B3 - 0), the
non-cooperative equilibria (with or wíthout monitoring the rival's weapon
stock) coincide with the cooperative outcoae with e moratorium on inveataent
in weapons.
6. STACKELBERG LEADEHSHIP
This section considers the situatíon vhere one of the countries attempta
to improve ita welfare by announcing ita investments in arms or its
investment strategy beforehand, so that e Stackelberg equilibrium is
appropriate. As for the Nash equilibrium cortcept it ia poseible to
diatinguish the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium without monitoring and the
subgame-perfect or Feedback Stackelberg equilibríum with aonitoring,
Consider first the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium ( aee e.g. Beyar and
Olsder [1982]) with the Weat as the leader and the East as the follower. The
leader is easumed to be able to pre-comait itself to an announced sequence
of investment levels 1n arms. The rational reaction of the follower is g~ - . ~
(a 481)~8z where ~ ia given by ( 14). This impliea thet the follower's level
of investment in arms is characterised by the differentiel equation
~ ~ .
B - (r.b)B ~ [84(a -a) - 93 - (rrb)81]Ie2. 6l0) is free (33)
The leader then meximisea its intertea . poral utility V(O,a0,e0), given by
(3), subject to the arms accuaulation for home and foreign weapons, (4), and
subject to the racional reection of the follower, (33). The first-order
conditions give rise to (4) for e and e~, (33) and
e - (r~b)g ~ [e4(e-e~H182) - B3 - lrib)el)182. 6(0) is eree (34)
. ~
~. -(rib)a. - 84(a-s iHI82) ~ B3. A~(0) is free (35)
H ' -bH - a~. u(o) - o
(3b)zo
where a~ and x denote the leader's "shadowprices" of the foreign weapon
stock end the foreign investment level, respectively. Note that ea far as
~
the leader is concerned, the follower's investment level, g, is free to
jump at time zero and therefore its marginal contribution to the leader's
welfare at that time muat be zero, so that x(0) ~ 0. The steady atate oF (4)
and (33)-(36) yields the steady-state levels of investment in arms
gs ~ B - 8394[b . 84~(r.b)827C84 . (r.b)Zb2B2 ~ 3(r.b)bB2B4~-1 (37)
g s~ B - Ce384~(r.b)e2~Ie~ .(r.b)Zb282 ~ 3(r.b)b92841-1 (38)
and the steady-state value of the leader's shadowprice of the foreign
investment level
x(m) ' 8Z93[294 , ( r,b)b8~7Ceq . (r.b)2b282 ~ 3(r~b)beZe4]-1. (39)
Both countries accumulate less weapons than in the open-loop Nash
equilibrium, but the leader accumulates less weapons than the follower (gs t
's o g t g). Hence, the world is a lesa safe place beceuae "balance of terror"
ia disturbed. The leader is always nt least as well off in the open-loop
Stackelberg equilibrium as in the open-loop Nash equilibrium, because it has
the option not to exploit the follower's reaction curve. lt follows that the
loss in security, due to less arms accumulation than the rival, is
outweighed by the gain in "butter". The follower also has a higher welfare
than in the open-loop Nash equilibrium, because it can conaume more "butter"
and has a higher level of security. Finally, it can be shown, after
considerable algebraic manipulation, that the leader is worse off than theu
follower in the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, because the diaadvantage
of lesa security exceeds the adventage of more "butter" ( D(a s,ea) -
" ~
D(as.a a) ) U(gs) - U(g s) where ag and a a are the steady-state levels of
weapon stocks in the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium). Obvioualy, one gets
the seme resulta with the East es the leader and the Weat sa the follower,
so that there is a atalemate in that neither the West nor the East wishes to
be leader.
The leader's optimal sequence of levela of investaent in arma ia time-
inconsistent (Kydland and Prescott [1977]I. The leader has an incentive to
announce a relatively low level of investment in arms in order to induce the
follower to do the same and, once the follower has locked itaelf into a low
level of investment in arms, it pays the leader to renege and increase its
security end welfare by investing more in arms. Thia can be seen from the
fact that the shadowprice of the foreign inveatment level, H, is strictly
positive for t) 0, whereas reoptimising at a later stage would imply that u
is reset to zero. It followa that the leader increases its investment in
arms when it reneges. One solution to this problem of time-inconsistency is
the "loss-of-leadership" solution (Buiter [1983]), which replaces (36) by
u(t) - 0 for ell t) 0. This solutíon coincidea with the open-loop Nash
equilibrium and therefore leada to a higher level of investment in arms and
a loss of welfare for both countries. The "loss-of-leadership" aolution is
time-consistent ea the leeder has effectively given up íta role as leader,
but it 1s obviously not aubgeme perfect. Mother aolution to the problem of
time-inconaistency is to conaider the aubgame-perfect or feedback
Stackelberg equilibrium (Ba;ar end Olader [1982]), which ia time-conaiatent
by definition, but which requires closed-loop information patterns. Because
the indirect utility functions, (1), do not depend upon foreign levels of22
investment in weapons, the subgame-perfect Stackelberg equilibrium coíncidea
with the aubgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. It is to be expected that the
enforcement of credibility of the leader'e announcement again leads to
higher stocks oP arms as with the loss-of-leaderahip aolution. However,
there is an opposing force arising from the benefita of monitoring which
leads to lower weapon stocka. It cen be shown, after considerable algebraic
manipulation, that when the relative priority of "butter" rather than "guns"
(82~84) is very high the monitoring force dominates and that therefore the
imposition of subgeme perfectness for the Stackelberg equilibrium also leads
r
to less weapon stocks (gp ~ gs ~ g a)
In the Steckelberg equilibrium it is assumed that one of the countriea
reacts rationally to the investments in r.rms or the investment strategy of
the rival country and that this rival country chooses an optimal ínvestment
policy, which tekes account of that rational reaction. The conaistent
conjectural variations equilibrium (Bresnahan [1981]) attempts to capture
this idea for the two countries at once by introducing conjectured reaction
coefficients for both countries, which have to be consistent with the actual
reaction ccefficients. Although this equílibrium concept is logícally not
very well founded (de Zeeuw end van der Plceg [1987]), it would again lead,
for the problem of competitive arms accumulation, to the same subgame-
perfect equilibrium.
~. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The conflict over arms accumulation between two countries, whose
governments conaider a"guna vereus Dutter" dilemma, can be modelled as a
differential game. Cooperation would lead to a moratorium on inveatment in
weapons, which corresponds to a multilateral arms treaty. The open-loop Nash23
equilibrium presumes that countriea cennot condition their investments in
arms on the rival's current weapon atock, wheresa the perfect Nesh
equilibrium presumes that they cen. The perfect Nash equilibrium leads to
lower levels of arma accumulation end more "butter", ao that it is more
efficient. It follows that en uníleteral arma treaty ahould enable countries
to obaerve their rival's weapon atock. Moreover, the perfect Neah
equilibrium givea a more satisfactory atrategic foundation of the Richardson
equations which shows that investment in arma increaeea proportionately with
the level of weapon atocks of the rival nation ("defence") and the deaired
weapon lead ("grievance" or "hatred") end decreeaee proportlonately with the
economic burden of ita own weapon atock ("fatigue"). The deaired lead in
weapon stocka over the rival country end the reletive priority of "guna"
rather than "butter" poaitlvely influence the grievence ccefficients end
therefore the steady-state levels of weapon atocks. The discount rate, the
depreciatíon rate and the relative priority of "butter" rather than "guna"
negatively influence the defence ccefficients end therefore the speed of
adjustment to the steady state. The fatigue ccefficienta consiat of the sum
of the defence coefficients and the depreciatíon rate.
There are several interesting directions for further research. The first
direction is to improve the micro-economic foundations of the economic
models of the WaYt and the East end to allow for asymmetries in these
models. For example, in the present paper the government of the Weat uaea
lump-sum taxation to finance the investment in weapons. Because such taxes
are non-distortionary, the two economies are identical rhen technologies and
preferences are the same. However, when the government of the West hea to
resort to distortionary taxea on labour income, then output, employment end
consumption are lower ín the West than in the East for a given level of24
investment in weapons, end elao the ateady-atate level of weapon stocks is
lower. Distortionary taxes considerably complicate the indirect utility and
value functions, so that one has to resort to numerical methoda for the
calculation of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (van der Plceg and de Zeeuw
[1989]). Obviously, a more intereating model would not only allow for
distortionary taxes but also for money- and debt-finence of government
investment in arms end for different technologies and preferences. To take
another example, when wages and prices do not clear the labour and goods
markets instentaneously, it may be reasonable to assume that the West is in
a regime of Keynesian unemployment and the East in a regime of repreased
inflation (Malinvaud [19~7]). Since the West has an exceas supply of labour
and goods, investment in weapona not only increasea the feeling of security
but has also Keynesian employment generating effects. However, the East has
en excesa demand for labour end goods, so that investment in weapons
increeses the feeling of security at the expense of more rationing. The
second direction for further reaearch is to allow also for economic linkages
between the two countries, due to bilateral trade flows and international
capital movements. If there ia nominal (real) wage rigidity in both
countries and if there are floating exchange rates, government inveatment in
weepona ia a locomotive (beggar-thy-neighbour) policy. It Pollows that, in
the absence of international policy coordination, government investment in
weapons is too low (high) as the beneficisl (adverse) effects on the rival
country are ignored. Finally, the third direction of further research is to
investigate when cooperation in arms accumulation is counter-productive. For
exemple, when government policy is time-inconsistent due to, say, nominal
wege rigidity, cooperation can exacerbate the credibility constraints with25
respect to the private sector end therefore be counter-productive (Rogoff
[1985]).
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